Israel’s Forever War

Israel’s announcement of the expansion of the war and a new humanitarian aid mechanism are worrying signs it is stuck in a strategic cul de sac

Tomorrow marks the one year anniversary of the start of the Rafah offensive in Gaza. At the time, Prime Minister Netanyahu and Israeli government officials were arguing that taking Rafah would put Israel only weeks away from “total victory.” Unfortunately, three stories this past weekend are a reminder that instead of achieving that total victory Netanyahu promised more than a year ago, Israel is currently stuck in a strategic cul de sac similar to the ones that the United States faced for years in Iraq and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, 59 hostages continue to be held in Gaza.

The first story is the call up of thousands of Israeli reserves yet again and the approval of a scaled up offensive in Gaza. Though the plan will not be executed for at least a couple of weeks after President Trump’s visit to the region. There are varying reports on what this operation would look like, but the bottom line is that the IDF would reoccupy at least certain areas of Gaza if not all of it, and this time stay much longer, exercising full control in an effort to ensure Hamas does not melt away only to come back. This time the IDF will more seriously take on the task of counterinsurgency not only clearing territory, but holding it afterwards to ensure Hamas cannot come back. However, as I’ve written about previously, this plan will likely result in a new and horrific wave of humanitarian suffering in Gaza. Moreover, whatever force you expect to hold territory for the long-term in a counterinsurgency needs to have some legitimacy with the local population. The IDF has none with the population in Gaza. The Israeli government has refused to entertain any plans that involve Palestinian forces eventually controlling Gaza. Without that, not only is it impossible to build a long-term legitimate force to ensure security, but it also becomes impossible to generate any momentum for some kind of transitional international or Arab force. No foreign actor will go in unless there is a clear pathway for them to handover to Palestinians. And so the most likely outcome of this latest effort is greater political, social, and economic pressure on Israeli society and IDF fatalities as thousands of reservists are once again called up to service; greater suffering for Palestinian civilians from new fighting; and lack of progress in getting the hostages out.

The second development this weekend was reporting that Israel is planning on a new method for distributing aid in Gaza in an effort to try to prevent Hamas from syphoning it off. Again, it would not go into effect until after Trump’s visit. Unfortunately, early indicators are that this plan is likely to be highly impractical and not address the civilian needs of the population. According to reports, there would be four to ten distribution sites set up in Southern Gaza with outside contractors providing security and humanitarian aid workers distributing food. Individuals would have to make their way to these sites to receive a 44 pound parcel of primarily food and some medical supplies and then get that back to their families. Each package would be intended to last for one to two weeks. All recipients would be biometrically scanned to ensure Hamas members would not receive aid. The plan relies on bringing in 60 trucks of supplies a day into Gaza as opposed to the hundreds that have historically been necessary to feed the population.

Humanitarian organizations are already expressing grave alarm. They believe the plan could cause another mass displacement as Gazans move to position themselves near the hubs in the south. Moreover, four to ten distribution centers are not nearly enough for a population of more than 2 million as the previous system had 100 distribution centers. There is also a question of how people – many of whom are malnourished – are supposed to carry these heavy parcels of food back to their families, perhaps far away. And depending on the precise rhythm of distribution (whether once a week or every two weeks), one parcel would be enough for roughly half a meal to one meal per person per day for a family of 5.5, which is the average size in Gaza. On top of that, it’s unclear how this plan keeps people from having their food stolen by Hamas after they leave the distribution location. And you are replacing a system by which all needy people receive food, with a system where political decisions with imperfect information are being made about how aid gets in, which is in violation of basic humanitarian principles. I’ll admit that I am not briefed on all the details, and perhaps all of these issues have been addressed, but with the track record of facilitating the delivery of aid in Gaza over the past 18 months, there is little reason to be optimistic.

Finally, the third story is the missile attack by the Houthis on Sunday that penetrated Israeli and American missile defenses and hit near Ben Gurion airport injuring six. International carriers have temporarily cancelled most flights, which is inconvenient for many Israelis and economically costly. Hopefully, this pause in air traffic is short-lived, but the pain for Israel is real.

These actions by the Houthis are deplorable and I support continuing to conduct air strikes, which take out Hothi missile capabilities before they are launched either at Israel or at international shipping in the Red Sea. But we also have to be realistic about what is happening here and what might shape Houthi behavior. The Houthis see these strikes as major propaganda victories as they continue to present themselves as champions of the Palestinian cause. Only one thing has so far stopped these attacks over the past 18 months, and that has been ceasefires in Gaza. Just a few years ago, the Houthis fought a horrific civil war in Yemen that included regular intensive daily bombing from a coalition of Gulf States, and this was not enough to change Houthi calculus or behavior. It seems doubtful to me at this point, that using only a fraction of that fire power from the air, the U.S., Israel, and its allies are likely to cause the Houthis to change their calculus. The only thing that stops these unjustified attacks by the Houthis is a massive escalation of the military campaign in Yemen by the United States, which is not happening and simply not worth the cost for the United States, or a ceasefire in Gaza.

What do all three of these developments say about where Israel currently stands in the war? It feels eerily similar to where the United States was during the middle years of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. There is broad recognition both amongst the public and security experts that the initial assumptions about what could be accomplished and how quickly were way too optimistic. Many also understand that dramatic mistakes were made early in the conflict. However, there is still a fundamental disagreement between two camps. The first believes Israel has no choice but to keep going and try new strategies to achieve “victory” such as this new offensive and aid distribution mechanism. They are similar to Americans who supported trying multiple strategic shifts such as the 2007 surge in Iraq or Obama’s decision in 2009 to significantly increase troop levels in Afghanistan. The other school believes that the costs have grown too high and the best option is to cut a deal to end a war and get the hostages out.

If U.S. history is any judge, Israel is better off at this point cutting the best deal it can to end the war. Fighting these types of prolonged insurgencies with dwindling domestic support is unworkable in democracies - even if you achieve some tactical success. Given that Israelis do live in such a tough neighborhood and have a long history of dealing with conflict, their societal pain tolerance is higher than it is in the United States. However, there are two factors in the Israeli case, which will make support harder to sustain than in the U.S and are likely to accelerate an end to the conflict in Gaza. First, in the United States the brunt of the war was felt by a small all-volunteer-force with the majority of the American population shielded from the impact. In Israel, reservist mobilizations affect all of society. Second, for the U.S. ending the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan meant acknowledging defeat. For Israel, agreeing to end the war means a deal that gets all of the hostages out, which for the majority of the Israeli public, is the most important victory of all.