Where the Hostage Deal and Ceasefire Go Next: 3 Scenarios for Phase 2

A post-conflict governance deal is unlikely, but that doesn't mean the war will restart

Now that we thankfully have a hostage deal and ceasefire in place, there are already reports that the Trump Administration as well as Israeli, Egyptian, and Qatari mediators are beginning to work on the second phase of the deal. As a reminder, the first phase lasts for six weeks and results in the release of 33 Israeli hostages and hundreds of Palestinian prisoners, as well as a surge in humanitarian aide into Gaza. During this period the parties must negotiate on Phase 2. The basic parameters of Phase 2 are that Israel and Hamas agree on a post-conflict governance arrangement for Gaza that begins to take effect. Israel releases more Palestinian prisoners and continues with assistance flowing, and in exchange Hamas releases all the remaining living hostages. The hardest part of this by far is an agreement on day-after governance. And so the most important question right now is where will we be on Day 42? And what about an arrangement for post-conflict Gaza?

As I see it - 3 scenarios:

• A full deal on post conflict Gaza governance - This is the optimal outcome but also the least likely.

• No deal and a resumption of the war - This is the worst outcome, but unfortunately more likely than a deal on post conflict governance.

• Ending the war with no real agreement on the post-conflict governance - This is the most likely outcome. It will get the hostages out and end the fighting. But after 15 months Hamas will still be in charge of Gaza and the situation will basically go back to how it was, only with civilians in Gaza living in much worse conditions.

Lets break these down.

Scenario 1 - A full deal for real alternative governance in Gaza: What does a post-conflict governance deal on Gaza look like? There would need to be both governance and security arrangements. You need to establish basic security or Hamas will just take over again. Basic counterinsurgency 101. You can’t have the IDF or Hamas policing Gaza and there is no other readymade Palestinian force. So, you’d probably be looking at some kind of transitory Arab-led international force with a Palestinian component. Over time you would train up Palestinian Security Forces who would take over Gaza. At the same time, you would need an agreement on a transitionary governance structure that would eventually transition back to a unified West Bank and Gaza under one unified government. Is all of this sounding complicated? It is. Very complicated. Lets break down why this is all necessary.

It is highly unlikely that in any scenario the Arab States put forces into Gaza, but the only case is if they know they are handing off the situation to someone and are also not seen as occupiers. That means you need a Palestinian force that is an alternative to Hamas ready to take over from an international force. The only option there is the Palestinian Authority Security Forces. Though it will take a lot of time to train them. And the PA isn’t coming in with forces into Gaza unless they know that this all ends with Gaza and the West Bank reunited under one Palestinian Authority. They are not going to provide resources and take security responsibility to create a competing governance structure to their own. At the same though, the PA is quite weak and has very little credibility in Gaza let alone the West Bank. In summary

Need for a transitionary security force »» Need for a capable domestic Palestinian force » Transitionary governance plan that ultimately unifies Gaza and the West Bank

Hamas has to consent to all of this because the Arab states aren’t going to send security forces into Gaza to be shot at by Hamas. And if you try to establish any kind of domestic security force or governance structure from the inside that Hamas opposes, Hamas will just kill them. Why would Hamas agree? If they thought they could relinquish governing responsibility but keep their guns and rebuild (think Hezbollah), then Hamas might go for it. Why would anybody else agree to that? Well, you’d have to have a situation where Israel, the United States, the Arab States, and the Palestinian Authority were convinced that they could outgovern Hamas and provide better security and over time marginalize them, while at the same time Hamas assumes the opposite.

Add in the fact that the current Israeli government will never agree to a post-conflict arrangement whose objective is ultimately the reintegration of Gaza and the West Bank because that will create better conditions for a two-state solution. Realistically, for Netanyahu to pursue something like this, he’d have to form a unity government and bring in elements of the opposition and drop Smotrich. Hard to imagine. In fact, it was opposition to any such arrangement by Smotrich and Ben-Gvir that caused Netanyahu to stall for months on any serious discussion of day-after planning, which ultimately was central to his break with Gallant and Gantz. There may have been a chance to get such a deal if there had been systematic planning for this over the past year, but despite being pushed from many directions Netanyahu has largely refused.

In short - this is incredibly complex and hard to imagine how far negotiators will get in 42 days or frankly ever.

Scenario 2 - Things Fall Apart: This is obviously the worst case scenario. At the end of six weeks, the war restarts and the hostages don’t get out. Smotrich would be very happy with this outcome, as it would again open up the possibility of settlements in Gaza. It won’t lead to the destruction of Hamas, since you can’t replace something with nothing. But just perpetual conflict.

The good news is that I don’t believe Israeli government or Hamas really want to restart the war. And importantly, if there is one person who really doesn’t want the fighting to start again it’s Donald Trump. He is very happy right now being perceived as the peacemaker, and he doesn’t want this conflict distracting from his agenda. It’s likely he will put a lot of pressure on Israel, Egypt, and Qatar, to keep the ceasefire deal going.

Scenario 3 - A Symbolic Unimplementable Deal on Governance: This leaves us with the most likely scenario. Nobody wants to go back to fighting but a genuine deal on post-conflict Gaza is impossible. So instead, the parties agree on some vague unimplementable terms on post-conflict governance and kick the can down the road - not all that dissimilar from what they’ve done at the end of previous rounds of conflict - most notably in 2014. Essentially a “quiet for quiet.” Israel still gets all of the hostages. Hamas gets more prisoners, humanitarian assistance, and probably financial payoffs from Qatar. Everyone, including Trump, gets an end to the war.

This is better than restarting the conflict and not getting the hostages, but it will still be incredibly dissatisfying. Hamas will remain in power even after conducting the October 7th attacks. There will be no real major international effort on reconstruction without a new government, and so the people of Gaza will live in horrific conditions for years to come.

One final question. How does Netanyahu get this deal through the Israeli government - and specifically through Smotrich, who will have major objections to leaving Hamas in place? Probably by going to Trump and telling him that the only way he can pull this off and keep the hostage deal going is by giving Smotrich some huge gives in the West Bank, such as supporting annexation of some territory or a different extreme action along those lines. Will Trump and his team push back on this? Maybe. Ideologically many of them seem fine with annexation. But Trump also wants Israel-Saudi normalization, and if he understands that annexation jepordizes it, then maybe stands in the way.

This is all incredibly depressing. I hope I am wrong. It may have been different if Netanyahu had listened to Gallant, Gantz and the security establishment and undertaken a real post-conflict planning effort from the start. But it also may not have. We’ll never know.