Israel and Iran at War - What I Am Watching

Where this all goes based on my years of preparing for this possibility

For the 20 years that I have been in Washington working on issues of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, the specter of an Israel-Iran war has always been a frightening but real possibility. From 2009-2012 when I worked on the Iran Desk at the Pentagon, my job every day was to plan for the possibility of war with Iran and how to avoid it. Our biggest concern was always that a war would be triggered by an Israeli strike that would then draw the U.S. in. And so even while in recent months I had been writing that the chances of a strike had gone up, it was surreal last Thursday to be sitting on a J Street panel with an Israeli journalist speaking at a synagogue when the reports of an Israeli strike started to come in.

I have very strong feelings and worries for friends and colleagues who are in Israel right now and wishing them nothing but the best. I also have friends and colleagues with family and friends in Iran, and am thinking of them too.

But in this very long post I’m just going to focus on walking you through what I am watching at the moment and how this all might play out.

Strong early start for Israel but did the timing make sense? There is no doubt that the initial Israeli strike was incredibly impressive. They have killed a large number of Iran’s senior military leadership and nuclear scientists, established air superiority over Iran, taken out a meaningful amount of Iran’s missile capability, and put Israel in a very strong military position in this conflict. However, I have to ultimately associate myself with Ned Price’s view that there was a serious diplomatic alternative that should have been given more time. We don’t really know how this will end, and there are huge risks for Israel with this operation. War should always be a last resort because of the suffering and stress it is already bringing to civilians in both Iran and Israel. And the reality is that Israel didn’t treat war as a last resort in this case. It acted while other options that could have yielded the same or a better outcome were still available. But we are where we are. So it is more useful to talk about where things go from here.

Who holds the advantage in the missile battle? Let's start with the defense of Israel. We’ll talk plenty about the impacts on Iran in a moment. In the near-term, the biggest question is how many missiles Iran has and how many interceptors Israel has available to shoot them down. If one side has a clear advantage that might make all the difference in how bad this gets in Israel. Israel tried to take out as much of Iran’s missile capability with its initial attack on Thursday, and it appears to have done significant damage but the question is how much? We have seen since that Iran has the capacity to muster multiple rounds of missile and drone strikes on Israel. It also appears that Israel is shooting most of the stuff down. What we are seeing is very different from the events in April and October 2024 - one time salvos that were slowly generated and where Iran focused on military targets that Israel could largely anticipate. Now Iran is throwing the kitchen sink at Israel, firing all it can quickly and at what appear to be civilian targets across the country. The end result has been 23 Israelis killed and hundreds injured in the Tel Aviv and Haifa areas and their suburbs. How long will this go on for? How many interceptors does Israel have? How many missiles does Iran have left? (According to press reports Israeli intelligence believes Iran still has 2,000 missiles left). How much additional support can the U.S. provide in shooting these down? How quickly can the U.S. get more assets into the region? This equipment takes some time to move. Will Iran be able to manufacture more or get any resupply from Russia given how much it sold to the Russians for their war in Ukraine?

Bottom line: if Iran runs out first and is unable to inflict massive damage than Israel can conduct its operations relatively quickly and end the fight on its own terms. If Iranian strikes cause repeated mass casualty events and things get much worse because Israel runs out of interceptors, it’s an entirely different situation and you can expect more comprehensive strikes by Israel for weeks and increased pressure for the U.S. to enter the fight more directly beyond just defense of Israel.

How badly has Iran’s nuclear program been damaged? In the long-term, the question is whether or not this now pushes Iran towards pursuing a nuclear weapon and whether and how quickly, with its remaining nuclear infrastructure, it can build a bomb and what can be done to stop that. There are two components to this question. The first is having the nuclear material to build the bomb. Before the strike Iran had enough enriched uranium that it could convert to weapons grade uranium in a matter of days, and it likely still has that. The second is the process of build a device that could use the material to trigger a nuclear reaction. Estimates for how long it would take to go through that second part vary from a year to a few months depending on the type of device. The early reports are that Israel has done significant damage to a lot of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. This includes taking out much of Iran’s main facility at Natanz, and a lot of infrastructure at another important facility at Esfahan. It has also claimed credit for killing 10 nuclear scientists. However, it’s all still unclear precisely how much this sets the Iranians back.

The real confounding issue is whether any meaningful damage has been done to the Fordow facility, which is buried deep underground in a mountain near the city of Qom. According to the latest IAEA report, which was issued just weeks ago, Iran has enough enriched uranium at Fordow to get to nine nuclear weapons worth and can produce material for an initial bomb in a matter of days. According to reports we are seeing in the press and even commentary from Israeli officials, they can’t do real damage to Fordow - only the U.S. can with its Massive Ordnance Penetrator. Still, it would be mind boggling to launch a strike on Iran’s nuclear program with no ability to do damage on its most important facility. So I see three Israeli theories here for what they were thinking:

1. The Israelis have a creative plan for destroying Fordow. They are very good operationally. We should not underestimate them. However, the longer this goes without damage at Fordow the less likely this is to be true.

2. Israel has established air superiority and with drones and planes will be monitoring everything that goes in and out of Fordow and make it impossible for Iranian scientists and military to access it. Plausible. Hard to sustain over time.

3. The Israelis are hoping and banking on the fact that the dynamics of the war eventually cause the U.S. to enter and finish the job at Fordow. Really hoping this is not the Israeli plan over time.

Even if Iran suffers significant damage in the short-term, the long-term outcome here is still dicey. Iran will almost certainly be convinced that its only real deterrent is a nuclear weapons arsenal. The program will go deeper underground. Iran has already announced that it is going to cease cooperation with IAEA inspectors, because the information it provides makes the nuclear program vulnerable to attack. Bottom line: It’s unclear precisely how much the nuclear program has been set back. Fordow is the real wild card and we really have to hope that the crux of the Israeli plan there was not to draw the U.S. into taking it out. And in the long-term, Iran is almost certainly going for a nuclear weapon and you’ll need consistent repeated military action to try and stop it, unless the outcome of this was to convince the Iranians that the nuclear program is not worth pursuing. But that seems exceedingly unlikely.

How does this end? Right now I see three scenarios: (1) diplomatic deal with significant nuclear concessions; (2) drawn out conflict; (3) ceasefire without nuclear concessions; (4) regime collapse.

1. Diplomatic deal with significant nuclear concessions: This is the best outcome and the one the Israelis say they are driving towards. They want Iran to essentially give up and have Israel dictate terms by which Iran’s nuclear program no longer exists. That is a massive stretch goal at this point. Even though the Iranian leadership is under tremendous pressure right now, Iran is a proud nation and this type of total surrender is unlikely even if things get much worse. Still, this is where the U.S. can step in and negotiate what could be a really good deal. Probably better than the JCPOA. Along the lines of what the Trump administration was trying to do before the war started, where Iran would agree to phase out all of its enrichment over time in exchange for a regional enrichment consortium not on Iranian soil that could provide nuclear fuel, but in a form that cannot be turned into weapons. Diving into diplomacy and trying to get this deal or at least the initial framework to end the war should be the first priority.

2. Drawn out conflict: Probably the most likely outcome at this point as with all wars is that it just drags on (see Gaza and Ukraine for example). Israel will continue to attack Iranian military infrastructure, regime targets, and perhaps further expand into taking out its oil infrastructure. We will also see many more Iranian civilians dying - the current estimate stands at 224. Meanwhile, Israeli civilians will continue to deal with Iranian missile strikes and runs to bomb shelters, and levels of destruction and death from missiles that they haven’t seen since the invention of Iron Dome. Both countries will suffer terribly economically. It’s an awful outcome for everyone. It’s also a world where over time the Iranians try to reconstitute their nuclear program, which will put a great deal of pressure on the U.S. on whether it should get involved and try to take out the Fordow facility.

3. Regime collapse: A bit more of a wildcard scenario is the possibility of Iranian regime collapse. After all, a significant part of the leadership has been eliminated and Iran is in a very weak position right now. However, history has shown us that regimes being overturned by air-bombing alone is an incredibly unlikely outcome without military opposition on the ground. There is no strong organized opposition that can rise up and take the country and neither the U.S. nor Israel are about to pursue a land invasion of Iran. If there were to be a regime collapse, as we saw during the Arab spring, it would most likely lead to chaos or civil war not necessarily democracy. And it’s still possible that whatever comes next would also be very hostile to Israel and the U.S. Though at least it would mean that Iran is incredibly divided internally and weak and unlikely to be able to threaten Israel in the same way. But the bottom line is that regime change is still so unlikely that it cannot be the basis for any strategy.

What is the U.S. role? The U.S. has three roles at this point. First, it will and should do everything it can to help defend Israel against Iranian missiles. That part is obvious.

The second, is that the United States still has a central role to play as a mediator or negotiator. Only the United States can apply the necessary pressure on Israel to stop, which means even though Iran doesn’t trust the U.S. at all, its leadership probably knows that it needs to deal with the Americans and with Trump to try to get a deal that ends the war.

The third role for the U.S. is as a combatant, especially since it is only the United States that has the capacity to take out the Fordow facility. There is a case to be made for doing that as a world in which this conflict ends and Iran still has the capacity to pursue a nuclear weapon with Fordow intact is a world in which Iran could very quickly have nuclear weapons. However, the second we do that, the U.S. is in the fight. That means Iran potentially responds with missile strikes on U.S. bases in the Gulf and begins targeting our forces and facilities around the globe. It also potentially draws us into a long-term commitment to this war - something that is completely the opposite of what Trump campaigned on and also could be a major distraction where the priority in the long run is still competition with China. Moreover, the second the U.S. strikes Iran it also cuts off diplomacy and any possibility of a deal in the immediate, since we are no longer mediating but instead in the fight itself.

At this point by far the best role for the U.S. is to continue to defend Israel and try to get a deal that ends the war and gets the necessary nuclear concessions from Iran. Unless there are strong indicators of Iran dashing to a nuclear weapon at Fordow, there is still time to pursue that option later if it becomes necessary.

How long will the rally around the flag effect last in Israel? Before the war started last Thursday, Netanyahu was deeply unpopular in Israel with most polls showing the Israeli public would vote him and his coalition out by a wide margin in the next election. The public was disenchanted with the dead-end in Gaza and 70% had come around to the view that they would support ending the war in exchange for the hostages. The public mood has now totally flipped. The Israeli public seems to be entirely behind the decision to go to war though I haven’t seen any public polling yet. Even opposition figures like Yair Golan and Yair Lapid have been supportive. The question is how long will this support last? If this becomes a prolonged conflict with no clear end game in sight and Israelis dealing with daily missile strikes from Iran, will the public turn against it? Will that even matter to Netanyahu given how he has approached Gaza? Still, as a democracy Israel’s ability to sustain this war will certainly be linked to public opinion, which cannot be guaranteed in perpetuity.

The region is mostly unhappy right now. I have seen some outdated notions in the U.S. press that other Middle Eastern countries are secretly happy this is happening. There might be some who feel that way. There is no love for the Iranian regime, and in the past some of these countries had urged U.S. military action. But none of the Middle Eastern states want thousands of missiles flying over their territory. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which have traditionally been the most hawkish about Iran, have in recent years come around to the view that reorienting their economics away from oil and becoming some of the most important global financial and technology global players is their first priority, and a regional war just undermines that. They are I’m sure pleased that things are going badly for Iran even as publicly they condemn Israel. But given the number of U.S. troops and bases on their territory, they are quite concerned that if we get involved you could see missile strikes targeting our bases or even their own civilian infrastructure. This is not what they wanted.

The greatest threat and challenge to Israel is still the Palestinian issue. It is also important to remember that even as the world’s focus shifts to Iran, we cannot forget that the greatest threat to Israel’s security and democratic and Jewish nature is the unresolved conflict with the Palestinians. There are millions of Palestinians living between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. Iran is thousands of miles away. Even as Israel shows remarkable ingenuity and technical prowess in knocking down missiles and conducting air strikes thousands of miles away, it is the much more low tech challenge on their own border that is still the greatest issue facing the country. Yes. Iran supports Hamas, but it was not the catalyst behind October 7th and the weapons and money it provided were an add on, but not the real source of Hamas’s power, which is fundamentally Palestinian. In one day, Hamas using guns, bulldozers, and gliders managed to cause more horror, damage, and trauma to Israeli society than Iran has ever caused or is likely to cause in this war. Israeli hostages are still being held in Gaza. 2.2 million people are still living under horrific humanitarian conditions in Gaza. The Israeli Defense Forces are still bogged down in Gaza with wave after wave of reserve call ups. Israel’s international standing and legitimacy are still being eroded because of what is happening in Gaza.

The most important thing that Israel can do for its long term security is come to an agreement that ends the war in Gaza, gets the hostages out, and gets humanitarian aid in. It can then work with the Arab world on a real political, security, and reconstruction plan for the day after that ensures Hamas no longer governs Gaza. And it can use that effort as a springboard for an eventual “23 state solution” – a comprehensive peace between Israel and all of the Arab states with the creation of a new demilitarized Palestinian state. That is such a more affirmative and better future for Israel than what we are looking at right now.